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Police Development  
in Papua New Guinea:  
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Gordon Peake and Sinclair Dinnen 
Since the late 1980s, a succession of Australian-funded programs has sought to strengthen the 
Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC).  The results of these efforts have, to say the 
least, been extremely modest.  This article critically examines the underlying approach to donor 
assistance to the RPNGC, arguing, among other things, that it has failed to engage with the 
realities of normative and regulatory pluralism in Papua New Guinea’s famously diverse social 
landscape.  More fulsome acknowledgement of these plural realities, and the adoption of more 
innovative approaches to internal security provision that can harness and better align the 
strengths of different providers is likely to yield better results than a continuing reliance on state 
police alone.  
On 4 November 2013, a Virgin Australia plane carrying thirty members of the 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) touched down to an elaborate reception at 
Port Moresby’s Jacksons airport.  Colourfully dressed sing-sing dancers and 
an immaculately turned out police band serenaded the officers off the plane 
and into the tropical heat.  A phalanx of senior government officials from both 
Australia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) were waiting to welcome the new 
arrivals to what would be the ninth discrete police development program in 
the past twenty-five years.  
The speeches and comments indicated high expectations of the new 
arrivals, who were the first of a total of fifty police that would arrive in PNG 
before year's end.
1
  The Australian High Commissioner said the officers 
would “provide frontline advisory support” to the Royal Papua New Guinea 
Constabulary (RPNGC), declaring their appearance a “milestone” in relations 
between the two countries as well as being “the start of an exciting new 
phase in the PNG-Australia policing partnership”.
2
  The AFP Commissioner 
told the media that “the goal of our enhanced mission is, in partnership with 
the RPNGC, to continue to develop the capacity of the RPNGC to provide 
                                                 
1
 These incoming Australian Federal Police (AFP) officers joined with an existing AFP 
advisory deployment of seventeen police officers that has been working in the 
country since 2008. 
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sustainable and quality policing to the people of PNG”.
3
  The deployment of 
the fifty police to PNG is costed at $132 million over four years and forms 
part of the deal on asylum seeker processing concluded by Prime Ministers 
of Australia and PNG, Kevin Rudd and Peter O’Neill, on the eve of the 2013 
Australian election.
4
 
Time will tell whether this intervention will generate any more substantive 
results than programs which have gone before it.  From the late 1980s, a 
succession of donor-funded programs and training packages were 
developed to strengthen internal RPNGC systems and processes and 
improve operational performance.
5
  The normative assumption is that, by 
supporting the formal police institution, one is helping the citizenry.  Each 
initiative has been framed largely in similar, state-centric terms and focused 
on working with familiar (i.e. Western/Australian) institutional forms. 
The outcome of all this effort so far appears rather modest in terms either of 
enhancements in the capacities of the organisation as well as improvements 
in security and justice outcomes for end-users.  It is striking that the 
language used to diagnose the RPNGC’s frailties in 2014 is practically 
identical to that used at the beginning of the first program.  With such 
underwhelming results, the effectiveness, value-for-money and impact of all 
these efforts is very much an open question but so also is the underlying 
approach, which is focused primarily on institutional capacity building.  In the 
last twenty-five years, proffered solutions have remained focused squarely 
on working with taken-for-granted institutional forms and echo the same 
types of efforts tried before.  
Casting solutions in terms of additional supply side responses is alluring and 
politically convenient.  It demonstrates Australian is ‘doing something’ that is 
visible and can be seen.  However, the problems within the RPNGC are 
more existential and fundamental than can be solved simply through the 
deployment of additional expatriate advisers.  This is because the model of 
policing embodied in the RPNGC may simply not be relevant or applicable 
for much of PNG.  In reality, the RPNGC constitutes only one of multiple 
sources of regulatory or dispute-resolving power in a country renowned for 
its normative pluralism.  Although there have been a number of voices over 
the years noting the salience of community-based and private systems of 
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governance and order-maintenance that message has not translated 
consistently into Australian programming approaches.  More explicit 
acknowledgement of these plural realities, exploring more innovative 
approaches to security provision that can harness and better align the 
strengths of different providers may yield better results than near-sole 
reliance on state police alone.  Going forward, this entails engaging with both 
‘above’ and ‘below’ the State.  
This article is divided into four main sections.  The first traces the origins of 
the RPNGC and shows that concerns about crime and the adequacy of the 
police response are not new.  The limited returns from focusing exclusively 
on the formal police institution have been long observed.  The second 
section presents data identifying the scale of the problems in present-day 
PNG, issues which the police have proven manifestly unable to tackle.  
Indeed, in some instances, the actions of the police contribute to disorder as 
much as resolve it.  The third section shows a remarkable consistency over 
the years in terms both of the diagnosis of the RPNGC’s ills and their 
proposed official remedy, namely institutional capacity building.  Few of 
these solutions—often predicated on the assumption that what ‘works’ in 
Australia and other metropolitan contexts can be transplanted directly to 
PNG—have flourished.  This indicates a fundamental issue around the 
appropriateness of the policing model itself, one that cannot be simply 
overcome with technical or administrative solutions, and tweaked delivery 
modalities.  
Against the backdrop of the generally modest outcomes of reform efforts to-
date, the final section of the article examines the work of scholars who point 
to the plural and multi-layered character of security and justice provision in 
Papua New Guinea. It charts a discernible shift in development thinking and 
program design with an increased focus on the need to engage with the 
broader spectrum of actors involved in provision, state and non-state.  
However, while this shift is evident in government and donor rhetoric in 
relation to PNG’s broader law and justice sector, it has manifested only a 
limited extent in terms of policing support.  Some examples of innovative 
programming show promising signs, including a donor-supported police 
development program in Bougainville but these remain in many ways outlier 
initiatives.  Other, still under-researched, examples of potential innovation 
comprise security programming supported by transnational resource 
corporations.  The dominant frame remains avowedly focused on capacity-
building solutions with the RPNGC, despite evidence accumulated since 
independence suggesting that such an approach—on its own—is unlikely to 
reap dividends.  It is puzzling that the solution proposed is often the same as 
what failed before.  
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The RPNGC: Never a Good Fit 
On 8 March 1975, the then Australian Attorney-General, Kep Enderby 
received a disheartening telex from Michael Somare, Chief Minister of Papua 
New Guinea.  Less than eight months before the granting of independence, 
Somare’s message was sombre and downbeat.  He described a “serious 
and mounting concern … particularly in the urban areas on the apparent lack 
of a coordinated government plan to deal with the control and prevention of 
crime.”
6
  
The Australian Government response was to assemble a meeting of experts 
in Port Moresby to discuss the issue.  Participants at a seminar in July 1975 
warned of a “serious crime problem developing” and of the “sad” condition of 
the country’s police force.  William Clifford, an Australian criminologist, wrote 
that many Port Moresby residents were “accustomed to their houses being 
broken into and their property stolen … that they feel exposed, unprotected 
and downright resentful.”
7
  Unemployment, substance abuse, urban drift and 
inequality were identified as drivers of insecurity, conflict-exacerbating 
factors that remain nearly forty years on.  
In terms of enforcement, there was a sense that the RPNGC was not up to 
the scale of the challenge.  In a ten-month period in 1973-74, there were 
2,051 ‘breaking and entering’ reports to the police, of which just 191 were 
cleared up.
8
  In mitigation, the RPNGC cited growing societal pressures—the 
increasing availability of liquor, poor housing and weakening of social 
controls in urban settlements—as inhibiting their efforts.
9
  In 1975, the police 
were claiming that juvenile crime was reaching “alarming proportions” in 
urban areas.
10
  
Then, as now, these concerns were linked to the weakness of policing 
capacity and, in particular, seemingly endemic managerial weakness within 
the RPNGC.  A consistent refrain was that the police were not up to the task 
and that its best days were behind it.  Clifford wrote that the RPNGC was, 
then “only a shadow of the former stolid and capable force for law and 
order”.
11
  However, in many ways, such a perception of capability was rose-
tinted.  The RPNGC appear never to have had a ‘golden era’.  Even before 
independence, a range of voices warned of the threats posed by a potential 
breakdown of ‘law and order’ as crime increased in Port Moresby and other 
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urban centres, and tribal conflict re-appeared in parts of the Highlands.
12
  
The constabulary in its current form had been formed less than ten years 
before independence and was an amalgam of the Royal Papuan 
Constabulary and the New Guinea Police force originally established by 
colonial authorities in the Territories of Papua and New Guinea.  The police 
in their current form have their origins in Australia’s efforts to create the 
structure—critics would argue that it was more a façade—of a modern, 
bureaucratic state, and marked a deviation from older colonial approaches to 
policing.  
The establishment of the RPNGC represented a break from previous 
traditions of order-maintenance in PNG.  Throughout much of the colonial 
period, the policing, judicial, and penal powers of the colonial state as it 
applied to indigenes formed part of a largely undifferentiated system of 
‘native administration’ that was aimed primarily at extending and 
consolidating government authority rather than crime prevention and law 
enforcement.
13
  This system was personified in the office of the patrol officer 
or kiap, who acted simultaneously as government agent, police officer, 
prosecutor, magistrate, and gaoler.  Although backed by the threat of deadly 
force, the kiap, accompanied by an armed ‘native constabulary’, 
administered a form of de facto and, in practice, often intermittent and 
idiosyncratic, community policing to widely dispersed and largely self-
regulating rural populations.  This approach appears to have worked 
reasonably well at the time, in part because it entailed pragmatic 
accommodations being made between the authority of the colonial state and 
that of the diverse and largely self-regulating local societies comprising the 
territories of Papua and New Guinea.
14
  In theory, if not always in practice, 
rural policing was a co-production between colonial and traditional 
authorities at local levels.  A more familiar Anglo-Australian policing model 
was found only in the urban enclaves, where a small number of full-time and 
uniformed expatriate police officers catered primarily to the policing needs of 
the European elite.  
The different approaches to policing in rural and urban areas were to 
gradually disappear as Australian authorities embarked on their modernising 
mission, to be replaced by the uniform and centralised model of policing 
found throughout the Commonwealth.  The RPNGC, therefore, owes more to 
this ‘urban-based’ model of policing than to the tradition of the kiap. 
To this end, the constabulary was separated from the Department of Native 
Affairs in 1961 and in 1966 it was removed from the control of the Public 
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Services Commission in order to ensure its neutrality.
15
  Mobile squads were 
established after the police reorganisation in 1966 and were used in 
response to the revival of tribal conflict in parts of the Highlands, as well as 
in public order situations including around contested development projects 
such as the construction of the Panguna mine in Bougainville.  The 
resources of centralised policing were concentrated in urban areas, 
accentuating a significant physical (and social) separation between the 
police and the predominantly rural populace.  Police responsibility in 1975 
was estimated to cover only 10 per cent of the country’s total land area and 
40 per cent of the population.
16
  For many observers, the dismantling of the 
old colonial system of administration led to an effective withdrawal of the 
state from rural areas.  In 1971, for example, all police posts were accessible 
by road in a country where the road accessed only a small minority of the 
population.  This retreat of the state from the most local levels was 
accompanied by growing resort to violent forms of self-help in some parts, 
including the revival of tribal fighting in areas where it had previously been 
successfully suppressed by colonial authorities.
17
 
In many ways, the RPNGC has become more truncated in reach since 
independence.  While PNG’s population has more than trebled since 1975, 
the size of the RPNGC has not increased significantly since then.  Recent 
figures indicate that in 2013 around 5,387 sworn uniformed personnel were 
responsible for policing around 7.5 million people dispersed across PNG’s 
varied topography.
18
 Even that figure may over-estimate the number of 
officers engaged in policing activities in two respects.  First, a substantial 
percentage of the police mobile squads are essentially contracted out to 
resource companies, and, for that reason, tend to be concentrated in or 
around resource projects.  Second, the numbers ‘on the books’ is hard to 
square with the numbers of police at work.  More than 550 officers are 
reputed to be at work in the National Capital District, yet the average work 
shift in a metropolitan police station comprises just a handful of officers. 
The urban bias in the RPNGC that was already marked before 
independence has become even more pronounced.  Most police resources 
are concentrated in urban areas, while 85 per cent of Papua New Guineans 
reside in rural locations and continue to rely on informal approaches for 
resolving everyday disputes and maintaining security at local levels.  PNG’s 
diverse and much-publicised ‘law and order’ problems, associated with 
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larger processes of social and economic change, have added to an already 
complex policing environment. 
By the time of independence, there were two related strains of argument 
about the RPNGC, one technical and one more existential, relating to a 
basic problem of ‘fit’.  In organisation, purpose and role, the RPNGC, which 
had been established less than a decade previously, was a carbon copy of 
Australian policing organisations, a structure that might have fitted on the 
other side of the Coral Sea but not necessarily in PNG’s very different social 
environment.  Basing his analysis upon interviews with serving officers, 
Clifford wrote that: “the Police maintain … and not without some justification 
that a basic error in the administration of Papua New Guinea has been to 
import the Australian system of law which the people neither understand nor 
appreciate.”
19
  
These twin arguments have been rehearsed, revisited and revalidated in the 
subsequent literature about post-independence Papua New Guinea.
20
  A 
thread that runs through many of the critiques of both police practice and 
reform in PNG is that efforts are monochromatic in their institutional focus 
and state-centric in orientation, predicated upon a concept of the State that, 
in reality, does not exist.  An important aspect of many of these critiques 
revolves around the broader question of relevance.  The RPNGC continues 
to be urban-based police in a country where most of the population live in 
rural settings; donors, perhaps because they themselves are also based in 
metropolitan centres, tend to under-estimate the limited reach of RPNGC 
and its penetration of local societies.  Beyond authors’ names and 
publication dates, it can sometimes be hard to distinguish critiques from 
1975 from those tabled nearly forty years later.   
PNG’s Crime Problems 
Paralleling the meme of inadequate policing is the impression of an imminent 
breakdown of ‘law and order’, particularly in PNG’s urban centres.  This too 
has a long history, which some scholars have traced back to near the 
beginning of the last century.
21
  Certainly, issues of crime and criminality 
were central concerns during the transition from Australian colonial 
administration to independence.  The growth in urban crime and broader 
concerns with ‘law and order’ occurred against the backdrop of far-reaching 
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processes of institutional modernisation as the old colonial administrative 
system was gradually dismantled and replaced with the framework of 
modern statehood in preparation for eventual independence.  As well as 
removing discriminatory regulations applying to Papua New Guineans, such 
as those on movement and the consumption of alcohol, institutional 
modernisation required a separation between the executive, administrative 
and judicial arms of government, with particular implications for policing.  As 
colonial restrictions on movement were gradually lifted in the 1960s and 
young migrants flocked to town, levels of recorded crime increased, leading 
to the regular airing of such concerns.
22
 
Concerns about urban crime have become increasingly more pronounced 
since independence, broadly following the patterns of urban growth.  
Tangible manifestations of pervasive insecurity are to be found in the 
fortifications and razor-wire securing the homes of the wealthy and the 
massive expansion of private security services that are used by businesses, 
government departments, restaurants, hotels, and schools and colleges, to 
name a few.  Streets are routinely deserted in the evening and visitors 
warned not to visit certain areas or walk after dark.  In Port Moresby, criminal 
violence has been attributed to the activities of raskol gangs.  Some have 
depicted the evolution of these gangs as one of progressive organisational 
sophistication with the spread of criminal activities from socially 
disadvantaged communities to more respectable suburbs, the recruitment of 
better educated members, increasing use of violence (and firearms) in 
response to reactive and often brutal policing tactics, and growing 
connections to more powerful political and business actors in an urban milieu 
where criminal opportunities are continuously expanding.
23
  Other 
researchers have drawn attention to their relatively loose and fluid quality 
and continuities with more enduring aspects of Melanesian sociality.
24
   
The full scale of crime and violence in PNG is difficult to assess, given the 
limited coverage and poor quality of police data, the scarcity of national-level 
studies and the urban bias in the available research material.
25
  Yet various 
commentators and surveys estimate that violence victimisation rates in PNG 
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are among the highest in the world.  Recent data from both the RPNGC and 
from victimisation surveys suggest that crime has stabilised in recent years, 
and that in 2010 there was an overall reduction in total crime levels 
compared with those in 2000.
26
  However, levels of unreported crime are 
believed to be extremely high, particularly in rural areas where access to 
police and justice services are limited, but also in respect of certain crimes 
such as rape and other sexual offences even where such services are 
accessible.  Significant variations in the experience of crime and violence 
exist between urban and rural contexts, as well as within particular regional, 
rural and urban settings.  Contrary to the national trend, data for urban crime 
‘hot-spots’ suggests an increase in crime.  For example, in Lae, PNG’s 
second largest city, recent victimisation data indicates that aggregated 
property crimes have doubled, and aggregated violent crimes more than 
doubled in a two-year period between 2008 and 2010.
27
  The last available 
victimisation data for Port Moresby also suggests that the concentration of 
crime and violence moves location over time, with shifts away from the 
socially disadvantaged settlements—conventionally viewed as the main 
urban ‘hot-spots’—to more affluent suburbs, where more sophisticated 
security infrastructure and private security are in place.
28
   
The spread of firearms, both homemade and factory produced, has added 
greatly to problems of crime and violence.
29
  Tribal violence (frequently 
involving high-powered weapons) remains a major problem in parts of the 
Highlands and also appears to have migrated to some urban areas.
30
  
Sorcery-related violence has become a major concern in recent years.
31
  
Gender-based violence has long been recognised as a pervasive problem 
throughout PNG.  Nation-wide surveys undertaken by the Law Reform 
Commission in the 1980s found that 67 per cent of women in rural areas and 
56 per cent of women in urban areas had been violently abused by their 
husbands.
32
  Many Papua New Guineans, including members of the 
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RPNGC,
33
 continue to view domestic violence as a private matter.  
Reportedly 80-90 per cent of women seeking medical treatment do so as a 
result of domestic violence.
34
  Women and girls are also highly vulnerable to 
sexual and other types of violence in the public markets where they go to 
buy and sell produce and which play such a critical role in the informal 
economy.  Recent survey data from Port Moresby indicates that 55 per cent 
of females surveyed had experienced some form of violence in the city’s 
markets.
35
  Although there is no reliable nationwide data, rape is widespread 
within and outside of intimate relationships.  A recent multi-country study 
found a prevalence rate of 26.6 per cent for non-partner single perpetrator 
rape in PNG and an astonishing 59 per cent rate for intimate partner rape.
36
  
Reporting rates for rape and other crimes of violence against women are 
low, as are the chances of them being successfully prosecuted once 
reported.  According to one victimisation study, just 11 per cent of the 
respondents who had been sexually assaulted had reported the assault to 
the RPNGC.
37
  A survey of violence in Port Moresby’s markets found that 73 
per cent of female respondents did not follow up with any authorities 
following their experience of sexual violence.
38
  Household crime 
victimisation surveys indicate that “believed ineffectiveness of policing” is 
one of the contributory factors behind high levels of fear of violent crime.
39
  A 
2013 study undertaken in Lae found the “probability of a sexual violence 
case involving a female or child victim being successfully prosecuted are 
1:338 and 1:192, respectively”.
40
  It appears that sexual violence can be 
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committed with almost complete impunity in large swathes of the country.  
Little wonder the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Women’s Economic 
Opportunity Index 2012 ranks PNG at 125 out of 128 countries.
41
 
Beyond crimes of violence, corruption and financial crimes have also 
become endemic,
42
 and this is another matter that the RPNGC appears 
unable to tackle effectively.  The National Parliament’s Public Accounts 
Committee, has found “evidence of misappropriation, fraud, negligence and 
disregard for the law and for the welfare of the state by public servants at 
every level”.
43
  A large portion of the national budget, estimated by the public 
accounts committee to represent 25 per cent of the country’s GDP, is 
thought to be siphoned off through corruption.
44
  The World Bank recently 
concluded that PNG “faces serious risks of money laundering from various 
criminal activities including … misappropriation of public funds.”
45
  PNG was 
ranked 144 out of 177 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 
2013 Corruption Perceptions Index.
46
  The police themselves have not been 
immune to this problem, with allegations of collusion with criminals and 
corrupt officials through to low-level acts of extortion and theft from 
motorists.
47
  
While the scale and range of crime in PNG would be enough to test the most 
effective of police organisations, the capacity of the RPNGC appears to be 
decidedly limited and, indeed, their own actions may, in at least some 
instances, exacerbate the problem.  The ability of the RPNGC to investigate 
cases and provide files that meet minimum evidentiary standards has always 
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been low.  The vast majority of sexual violence cases submitted by the 
RPNGC to prosecutors do not get past the committal stage on grounds of 
inadequately prepared case files.  File management is hardly a new 
problem; the 1975 expert meeting identified file preparation as a deficiency 
within RPNGC. 
A consistent theme over the years has been police brutality.  As Dinnen has 
observed, the “violence of the state is hard to distinguish from the violence it 
seeks to control”.
48
  Public confidence in the police is low not solely because 
the institution is ineffective but also because there is perceived to be an 
entrenched culture of criminal behaviour, brutality and impunity within its 
ranks.
49
  RPNGC officers have been cited for involvement in torture, family 
and sexual violence, and gang rape.
50
  As an indication of the scale of the 
issue, claims against the state for improper use of police powers have 
previously amounted to more than double the annual budget of the RPNGC. 
Familiar Responses to Institutional Fragility 
Another time-honoured observation of analysts is that the RPNGC is without 
the technical accoutrements and quality personnel deemed necessary for it 
to function effectively.  Since the 1970s, a series of special committees and 
commissions have considered law and order, all reaching the conclusion that 
the police are overwhelmed by the scale and diversity of the challenge 
confronting them.  
The first (of many) stocktakings of the law and justice sector post-
independence was undertaken in 1984 and led by criminologist, William 
Clifford.  The report found that the RPNGC faced ‘manifold problems’ and 
noted an absence of standardised training, communication references, 
absence of standard procedures, and deficiencies in investigations.
51
  It also 
addressed the wider question of fit and appropriateness.  At the core of its 
critique was the perceived over-reliance on a state system whose 
appropriateness and sustainability was questionable.  
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(T)he possibility that existing services may be defective or inefficient—not 
because they are starved of resources but because they are either irrelevant 
to the situation in Papua New Guinea or refusing to work with 
communities—does not seem to have detained people long.
52
 
Concerted efforts were needed to improve the articulation between state and 
non-state approaches, with the role of the former being primarily to support 
and complement the latter.   
Despite the prescience of its insights, the Clifford Report remained a solitary 
voice and was, in any case, quickly overtaken by more pressing political 
concerns with responding to growing law and order problems in Port 
Moresby and elsewhere.  Instead of addressing ‘the gap’ between state and 
non-state security and justice providers identified in the Report, reliance on 
reactive and militarised policing responses, supplemented with periodic 
states of emergency and curfews, became the familiar shape of the crisis 
management approach by successive governments during the 1980s and 
early 1990s.
53
  The radicalism of the Report was, perhaps predictably, not 
especially palatable to members of the legal, judicial and policing 
establishment, and, moreover, held little appeal for a political elite with little 
appetite for reform in this area.  
The far-reaching implications of the report were also largely sidestepped by 
donors, who have concentrated on propping up the formal police institution, 
to the exclusion of other sources of authority.  Since Clifford’s report, there 
has been a raft of discrete Australian funded initiatives focused on the police, 
in addition to significant technical and advisory support tendered for other 
areas of the formal justice system such as courts, prisons, legal services and 
ombudsmen.  
These include three phases of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary 
Development Project, (1989-2005) managed by AusAID, four phases of the 
Papua New Guinea-Australia Policing Partnership (2008-present) managed 
by the Australian Federal Police and one short-lived Enhanced Co-operation 
Program (2004-05) which saw Australian police officers put into ‘in-line’ 
policing roles within the Constabulary.
54
  Additionally, police development 
has formed a component of a number of law and justice programs 
undertaken during that period. 
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Setting aside different managerial, contractual and reporting arrangements, 
the goals and underlying rationale of each particular police development 
program or project have been broadly similar.  The programs are informed 
by a linear conception of modernisation and fairly uncritical reliance on the 
institutional forms of Western police, with little consideration of alternative 
forms or approaches.  In development parlance, programming has adopted a 
‘deficit-based’ approach.  If ‘law and order’ was getting worse, it must be 
because the police agencies were not working properly and required more 
training, resources and capacity building.  The focus was on capacity 
building and institutional strengthening, focusing on areas of weakness such 
as fraud and anti-corruption, prosecutions, community relations, logistics, 
management and leadership training, finance and discipline.  In short, and 
consistent with trends elsewhere, the focus remained squarely on taken-for-
granted institutional forms, at the expense of any serious reflection on other 
ways of undertaking the functions assigned to them.  By contrast, Australia’s 
approaches to the overall sector, as opposed to the police, has adopted a 
more pluralistic viewpoint.  This followed the endorsement by the 
Government of Papua New Guinea in 2000 of the National Law and Justice 
Policy and Plan of Action.
55
  This policy sets out a broad vision for the law 
and justice sector as a whole, including but not confined to the police.  Sub-
titled ‘Toward Restorative Justice’, the Policy embodied a strong orientation 
towards crime prevention and restorative justice through engagement with 
community-based mechanisms and actors.  Australian support, initially 
through the AusAID-supported Law and Justice Program shifted in line with 
the PNG policy and its subsequent development.  This included establishing 
the Community Justice Liaison Unit as an innovative facility to foster 
collaboration between sector agencies and civil society organisations, very 
much in the spirit of the Clifford Report in 1984.
56
  While the bulk of 
Australian assistance has continued to concentrate on capacity-building with 
the formal agencies, the Papua New Guinea-Australia Law and Justice 
Partnership entailed significant support to village courts operating 
simultaneously through state law and local custom.  Support to the police 
has nevertheless remained largely immune to these shifting currents. 
Measuring the overall effect of all the endeavours to strengthen the RPNGC 
is difficult.  Numerical indicators such as numbers of officers trained and 
equipment handed out are output indicators of activity and not outcome 
indicators as to whether all the effort undertaken had any impact in terms of 
changed managerial behaviours or policing practice.  Certainly, however, the 
fact that advisory support continues to revolve around training and advising 
on the same set of issues would suggest that the effort expended heretofore 
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has not resulted in any particularly radical transformation.  There is a good 
argument that Australian support has helped assist the RPNGC to maintain 
a semblance of organisational functionality but not contributed meaningfully 
to realising fully the constabulary’s motto—Securing a Safer Community. 
The last major review of the RPNGC was conducted in 2004, fifteen years 
after the beginning of advisory support.
57
  The review found substandard 
police leadership, inadequate resourcing, poor budgeting, a culture of 
indiscipline and unaccountability, and an almost complete break-down in 
terms of community trust.
58
  Nearly ten years on, it is hard to imagine that 
findings are likely to be very much different were a similar exercise to be 
conducted. 
Seeing Familiar Trees but Rarely the Forest 
Anyone brave enough to wade through three decades of police-related 
designs, evaluations, monitoring reports, strategic plans, partnership 
agreements, protocols and lesson plans would probably form the conclusion 
that the RPNGC was the sole designated provider of safety and security in 
PNG.  Donor support remains focused squarely on assisting the RPNGC.  
The current AFP-led police development program is very much in that 
tradition. 
Concentrating on the formal police organisation, however, is at best only 
ever going to address part of the problem.  Such a focus appears somewhat 
blinkered.  For a start, its focus is almost exclusively on metropolitan areas, 
even though most citizens live in rural areas, geographically and culturally 
removed from the police.  In these places (as well as in urban centres) the 
majority of disputes are still addressed through a range of informal, 
community-based, mechanisms that owe more to restorative justice than 
investigation, prosecution and incarceration.  The picture emerging from 
many parts of PNG is of dispute resolution as the continuous interplay 
between different social orders which shape everything from the conduct of 
government, land usage, regulation of trade and commerce, to the 
management of conflict.  Beneath the meta-narrative of progressive 
deterioration, there are examples of diverse and often quite creative local 
responses in some areas that draw on a mix of state and non-state 
resources with an emphasis on prevention and reduction.  State policing only 
amounts to a small part of the picture and, in some places, is absent almost 
altogether.
59
  
                                                 
57
 Government of Papua New Guinea and Institute for National Affairs, ‘Report of the 
Administrative Review of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary’. 
58
 Ibid.  
59
 Volker Boege, M. Anne Brown and Kevin P. Clements, ‘Hybrid Political Orders, Not 
Fragile States’, Peace Review, vol. 21, no. 1 (2009), p. 17. 
Gordon Peake and Sinclair Dinnen 
- 48 - 
The diversity and localised character of such initiatives, as well as their 
general lack of visibility, makes it difficult to generalise a pattern.  This is also 
very much an under-researched area and more empirical work is required.  
However, most appear to share at least some of the characteristics 
associated with the relative success of the older, colonial era forms and 
modalities of governmentality.  As well as generally being community-driven 
and owned, these characteristics usually entail some configuration of 
horizontal and vertical linkages between different actors and levels of 
government.  Likewise, most of these initiatives have a distinctly hybrid 
character, drawing simultaneously upon different sources of authority and 
legitimacy (e.g. traditional, church and state).  Justice and security outcomes 
under these circumstances are the product of a process of co-production 
between multiple actors, rather than of a single agency or system.   
Policy in this area is shifting, slowly, to recognise the dappled realities of 
justice provision in the developing world.  Recent years have witnessed a 
noticeable shift in donor discourse and a growing acceptance of the need to 
move beyond a narrow state-centrism and reluctance to engage with non-
state providers of policing and justice services.  The need to work within the 
context of PNG’s vibrant pluralism—this is a country where more than 800 
languages are spoken—is now being recognised in many parts of the justice 
sector.  
However, despite the calls for innovation and initiatives with catalytic 
potential, examples of attempts to engage ‘beneath the state’ or experiment 
beyond the conventional policing frame are few and far between.  While 
animating a lively scholarly debate and generating normative shifts at the 
level of meta-policy, the practical impacts of the changing discourse have 
been more modest.  Recent independent reviews of Australian and New 
Zealand justice and policing assistance also note that despite the shifting 
rhetoric both governments’ endeavours in the region provided little support 
for actors operating beyond familiar institutional frameworks.  Police reform 
seems much less of a testing ground for innovative approaches than in other 
parts of the law and justice sector. 
There are exceptions.  A UN ‘Safer Cities’ Project in Port Moresby is working 
with the RPNGC and a wide variety of governmental and non-governmental 
stakeholders in the city’s markets.  In Eastern Highlands Province, District 
Peace Management Teams comprising provincial and district officials, 
police, village court officers and community and church leaders also play an 
important role in order-maintenance.  Trained in non-violent conflict 
resolution, they mediate between conflicting parties, broker ceasefires and 
help negotiate the terms of written peace agreements and resolve the 
underlying causes of local conflicts.  Breaches of these agreements can be 
reported to the police and offending parties penalised.  This initiative has 
reportedly resulted in a dramatic reduction in the incidence of inter-group 
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conflicts.
60
  Tribal fights have decreased from a baseline of eighty-four fights 
in 2007, to four fights in 2010, and two “active” fights as at April 2013.  
Another possible example, requiring further research, revolves around the 
work that extractive industries are doing in terms of security.  In the remote 
areas where these companies work, the presence of the government is 
either weak or absent altogether.  In such places, the potential for 
misunderstandings and disputes with local actors in the vicinity of the mine, 
comprising multiple groups, and including both people from the area and 
migrants from elsewhere, is considerable.  Transnational companies have 
developed their own security capabilities, often cooperating closely with state 
security and justice actors, notably the RPNGC, as well as with a range of 
non-state security actors at community levels.  Although there has been 
some research done on (innovations undertaken by) corporate security in 
Indonesian Papua, the topic has been underexplored on the eastern side of 
the island.
61
  Further research—resource extraction being the main animator 
behind current patterns of socio-economic change in PNG—would help 
identify if there are measures, initiatives and approaches that could be 
adopted in terms of better policing and, equally, if the resource companies 
are able to compel improved practice on the part of the RPNGC.
62
 
For now, the focus of most donor-funded policing projects remains gimlet-
eyed towards state policing, and with little apparent engagement with PNG’s 
plural realities.  One small exception is a project in Bougainville, which is 
engaging with hybrid local justice and security practices in the island’s still 
fragile post-conflict context, and would appear to be generating some 
positive outcomes.
63
 
Bougainville is officially policed by two separate but linked organisations: the 
Bougainville Police Service (BPS) and the Community Auxiliary Police 
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(CAP).  The BPS consists of approximately 163 sworn officers based in the 
three urban centres and, sitting under it, are nearly 340 members of the 
CAP, based in their own communities throughout rural Bougainville.  
The CAP is a hybrid institution in terms of its organisation and the different 
sources of its authority.  Although they are sworn members of the BPS, CAP 
officers are selected through a process that is in harmony with the dynamics 
of leadership and authority in rural communities.  Village chiefs nominate the 
officers and the Council of Elders must approve their candidacy before it can 
go any further.   
It is the CAP, rather than the BPS, that would appear to handle most policing 
in Bougainville.  Matters dealt with by CAP officers include assaults, family 
violence, land disputes, sorcery allegations and disputes stemming from the 
conflict.  The permanent presence of these officers in rural areas where the 
majority of people live contributes to the broad support they enjoy.  This fit 
with local aspirations lies behind the high degree of buy-in on the part of 
Bougainville’s political authorities—something that donors so often struggle 
to achieve.
64
  The CAP is funded through Bougainville’s current fiscal 
envelope.  Although policing is a critical part of the work of the CAP, their 
role is not just limited to law enforcement.  Many CAP officers perform 
important and multifaceted roles as awareness raisers, educators, 
mediators, conflict preventers and managers.  While operating within a 
framework of national law, the CAP works with the grain of local beliefs and 
practices, including by maintaining a close relationship with a wide range of 
local authorities. 
Conclusion 
A clear message emerging from an analysis of the literature on policing in 
PNG is that the more things change, the more they stay the same.  The 
similarities between analysis of PNG’s crime problems before independence 
and nearly forty years on are striking while a succession of similarly-focused 
programs attempting to build the police to conform to an Australian model 
have generated generally underwhelming results.  As the latest police 
development initiative shows, there remains blind faith in the transformative 
and catalytic potential and geographical reach of RPNGC despite ample 
evidence to the contrary.  
The article has pointed to a number of dispersed and programmatically 
unconnected initiatives ongoing in various parts of PNG.  Preliminary 
analysis of these endeavours suggests that going beyond the conventional 
inward focus on institutional capacity building appears to deliver some 
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promising results.  Approaches which are innovative, grounded in local 
realities would appear much more likely to accrue measureable outcomes in 
terms of improved safety, security and access to justice for citizens.  
Institution-focused capacity development without such alignment offers a low 
chance of success.  At the very least, there would appear to be a strong 
case for donors investing in police development to look in more detail at 
such cases of innovation rather than repeating what has gone before.  
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